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Abstract – Traders in a stock market exchange stock shares and form a stock trading network.
Trades at different positions of the stock trading network may contain different information. We
construct stock trading networks based on the limit order book data and classify traders into k
classes using the k-shell decomposition method. We investigate the influences of trading behaviors
on the price impact by comparing a closed national market (A-shares) with an international
market (B-shares), individuals and institutions, partially filled and filled trades, buyer-initiated
and seller-initiated trades, and trades at different positions of a trading network. Institutional
traders professionally use some trading strategies to reduce the price impact and individuals at
the same positions in the trading network have a higher price impact than institutions. We also
find that trades in the core have higher price impacts than those in the peripheral shell.
Introduction. – The availability of large-scale data
on economic and financial activities provides great chal-
lenges and new opportunities for us to gain a deeper under-
standing of the dynamics of complex economic and finan-
cial systems [1,2], in which the structure and evolutionary
dynamics of complex economic and financial networks play
an essential role [3–6]. In financial and economic networks,
the nodes represent financial or economic agents, such
as economies, companies, financial institutions, traders,
et al., while the links represent interactions between two
nodes, such as investment, trade, lending, economic coop-
eration, and so on [7–11].
The buy-sell interactions among traders in economic
systems can be described by trading networks, in which
the nodes represent the traders and the edges stand for
the trading relationships. The main statistical properties
(a)e-mail: wxzhou@ecust.edu.cn
of several trading networks have been investigated, such as
the Austrian money flow trading network [12], the trading
network in a web-based experimental prediction market
[13, 14], the daily trading networks in the Shenzhen stock
market [15], and the trading networks in the Shanghai
Futures Market [16]. Usually, these trading networks are
scale-free with power-law degree distributions and disas-
sortative.
The statistical properties of trading networks can be uti-
lized to track and detect abnormal trades implemented by
price manipulators in financial markets. Kyriakopoulos et
al. performed random matrix analysis to identify accounts
with financial misconduct [12], Tumminello et al. identi-
fied trader clusters with a very high degree of synchroniza-
tion in trading which implies to some extent the presence
of price manipulation [17], Sun et al. found significant
differences in the topological properties between manipu-
lated and non-manipulated stocks [18,19], and Jiang et al.
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studied the behavior and implications of abnormal trad-
ing motifs (self-loop, two-node loop, and two-node multi-
ple arcs) [20]. There are also studies on the correlations
between structural properties of trading networks and fi-
nancial variables of markets [21, 22]. It is also reported
that trading networks have predictive power over stock
price movements at the daily level [23] and traders’ re-
turns are correlated with their positions occupied in the
trading networks [24].
In this Letter, we investigate the immediate price im-
pact of institutional and individual trades at different po-
sitions of trading networks. The immediate price impact
was extensively studied, which is composed of the positive
correlations between trading volume and volatility. These
relations are robust at various time scales [25–27], even at
the transaction level [28–31]. Using the same order book
data [32,33], it is found that filled and partially filled limit
orders have very different price impacts [31]. The price im-
pact of trades from partially filled orders is constant when
the volume is not too large, while that of filled orders
shows a power-law behaviour r = ωα with α ≈ 2/3. Zhou
also found that large trade sizes, wide bid-ask spreads,
high liquidity at the same side and low liquidity at the
opposite side will cause a large price impact [34]. Using
the k-shell decomposition method, we extend the analysis
of immediate price impact by considering the positions of
trades at trading networks.
Construction of stock trading networks from
transaction data. – We will continue to investigate im-
mediate price impact of institutional and individual trades
by using the order book data in the Shenzhen Stock Ex-
change (SZSE). The data sets in this paper include the
order book data of 32 A-shares and 11 B-shares in the
SZSE. The A-share market and The B-share market both
are composed of common stocks which are issued by main-
land Chinese companies. The A-share market is opened
only to domestic investors, and traded in CNY. But the
B-share market is traded in Hong Kong dollar (HKD)
and was restricted to foreign investors before February
19, 2001, and since then it has been opened to Chinese
investors as well. A transaction is triggered by an incom-
ing market order matched with the limit orders waiting
on the opposite order book and accomplished by trans-
ferring shares from seller to buyer and cashes from buyer
to seller. It provides an opportunity to trace the order
execution procedure from a complex network perspective.
We use the same approach as presented in Refs. [15,20,
22] to construct stock trading networks. Firstly we re-
construct the limit order book based on the trading rules
and extract the detailed information of each transaction.
A node represents a trader who bought or sold the stock.
An undirected link is formed between two traders if they
had transactions between them. Then we present the
trades between pairwise traders into an symmetrical adja-
cent matrix An×n whose element aij equal to 1 or 0. Its
entry aij = 1 means that trader i has traded with trader j.
When a trader places an effective market order, it is possi-
ble that the order is executed by several orders which are
submitted by different traders on the limit order book. In
this case, the local network structure is a star-like graph.
Fig. 1: (color online) Topological structure of a stock trading
network. Each shell is labelled by a single index k with the
nodes colored uniquely. The nodes in the core are red. The size
of a node is proportional to its degree. For better visualization,
we plot 5% of the edges and the nodes with k ≥ 5.
Trader classification based on k-shell decomposi-
tion. – Analyzing the undirected unweighted stock trad-
ing networks, we classify traders into k shells using the
k-shell decomposition method. The 1-shell denotes the
peripheral shell of the trading network and the kmax-shell
denotes the traders in the core of the trading network.
Fig. 1 shows the k-shells of one stock trading network with
the LaNet-vi visualization [35], which provides a method
to extract information on the original graph and a way
to compare different structures of trading networks. The
algorithm provides a direct way to distinguish their dif-
ferent hierarchies and structural organization. Each shell
is labeled by a single shell index with the nodes colored
uniquely. The nodes in the core are drawn in red. The size
of a node is proportional to its original degree. The visu-
alization used a logarithmic scale for the sizes in Fig. 1.
The maximum degree is 1261 in the core of the trading
network. For clarity, we randomly select 5% of edges and
draw the nodes with the shell index k ≥ 5 in Fig. 1.
Basic statistics of immediate price impact and
trade size at the transaction level. – The immediate
price impact can be calculated as the percentage of mid-
price change caused by a trade at time t
r(t+ 1) = [p(t+ 1)− p(t)]/p(t) , (1)
where p(t) and p(t+ 1) are the mid-prices of the best bid
and ask right before and after the transaction at time t.
The data set allows us to compare a closed national market
(A-shares) with an international market (B-shares), indi-
viduals and institutions, partially filled and filled trades,
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Fig. 2: (color online) Box plots of average returns 〈r〉 and average trade sizes 〈ω〉 at the transaction level for A-share market (red),
B-share market (green), and all stocks (blue). For simplicity, we use subscripts PB, PS, FB, and FS to represent respectively
the four types of trades. The superscripts 0 and 1 stand respectively for individuals and institutions. The four columns from
left to right correspond to 〈r〉 of PB/PS trades, 〈r〉 of FB/FS trades, 〈ω〉 of PB/PS trades, and 〈ω〉 of FB/FS trades. The four
rows from top to bottom correspond to all trades, periphery trades, intermediate trades, and kernel trades.
buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades. In this Let-
ter, the two types of traders are individuals (superscript
‘0’) and institutions (superscript ‘1’). The trades are di-
vided into four types according to their directions and ag-
gressiveness [31, 36]: buyer-initiated partially filled (PB)
trades resulting from partially filled buy orders, seller-
initiated partially filled (PS) trades resulting from par-
tially filled sell orders, buyer-initiated filled (FB) trades
resulting from filled buy orders, and seller-initiated filled
(FS) trades resulting from filled sell orders. As an exam-
ple, ω0FS stands for the transaction size of seller-initiated
filled trades of individuals. The average return 〈r〉 and av-
erage transaction size 〈ω〉 corresponding to the four types
of trades are shown in the fist row of Fig. 2.
We classify the trades according to their positions in the
trading networks by using the k-shell algorithm, which di-
vides traders into kmax shells. For each stock trading net-
work, the position of each trader in the network is denoted
by the shell index k ∈ {1, 2, ..., kmax}. The kmax-shell is the
core of trading network. The position of trades, initiated
by traders in position k, is denoted by the corresponding
shell index k. We sort the trades in ascending order de-
pending on the value of the trades’ position k and divide
trades into three equal parts, termed periphery, interme-
diate, and kernel. The periphery trades are initiated by
traders in the peripheral shell and kernel trades are initi-
ated by traders in the kmax-core. We investigate whether
traders at different network positions (periphery, interme-
diate and kernel) have different behaviors. The average
return 〈r〉 and average transaction size 〈ω〉 corresponding
to the four types of trades at different network positions
are shown in the second, third and fourth rows of Fig. 2.
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According to the first and second columns of Fig. 2, the
most intriguing feature is that the immediate price impact
of partially filled trades is about 10 times of that of the
filled trades [31]. The absolute immediate price impact of
partially filled trades has an order of 10−3, while that of
filled trades has an order of 10−4. Moreover, according to
Fig. 2, there is no evident difference in the average sizes
and the price impacts between buyer-initiated trades and
seller-initiated trades.
We find that the average trade size of each type (PB,
PS, FB, and FS) submitted by individual traders in the
B-share market is larger than that in the A-share mar-
ket, thus the absolute price impact is also larger for B-
share trades. In contrast, the average size of B-share
trades is smaller than A-share trades for institutions. It
is reasonable that the absolute price impact of filled A-
share trades submitted by institutions is larger than filled
B-share trades, but partially filled A-share trades have
smaller absolute price impact than partially filled B-share
trades. This abnormal phenomenon cannot be explained
by the price gaps in the two markets [31, 34, 37].
We observe, for each of the four types of trades (PB, PS,
FB, and FS), institutional traders have larger immediate
price impacts than individual traders do:
〈r1PB,FB〉 > 〈r
0
PB,FB〉 and − 〈r
1
PS,FS〉 > −〈r
0
PS,FS〉, (2)
which is mainly caused by the fact that institutional
traders submit larger orders than individual traders:
〈ω1PB,PS,FB,FS〉 > 〈ω
0
PB,PS,FB,FS〉. (3)
This phenomenon is particularly evident for A-share
stocks and is marginal for B-share stocks.
In most cases, we find that trades closer to the kernel
have larger sizes and high immediate price impacts:{
〈rK〉 > 〈rI〉 > 〈rP〉
〈ωK〉 > 〈ωI〉 > 〈ωP〉
. (4)
This observation simply indicates that large trades are
more likely to be executed with more other trades and
incur larger price impacts.
Relationship between immediate price impact
and trade size at different network positions. – We
normalize r and ω for each type of trades in both A-share
and B-share markets by their averages 〈r〉 and 〈ω〉 [31].
For partially filled trades in Fig. 3 (A) and (B), when ω is
smaller than the average 〈ω〉, the price impact r(ω) is not
sensitive to trade size ω, and the normalized price impact
of individuals is slightly larger than that of institutions in
each position. Furthermore, the normalized price impact
is slightly larger for traders with small k. When ω > 〈ω〉,
r(ω) exhibits a significant upward trend, the normalized
price impact of individuals is smaller than that of institu-
tions in each position, and r(ω)/〈r〉 is larger for traders
with large k.
Table 1: Exponent α of power-law behaviour r ∼ ωα for buyer-
initiated filled trades and seller-initiated filled trades. The
analysis is conducted respectively for all stocks, A-shares and
B-shares. Due to their positions in the trading network, we
divide the traders into 3 types for individuals and institutions,
including periphery (P), intermediate (I) and kernel (K).
Market Type Pos. Individual Institution
A & B FB P 0.52± 0.02 0.46± 0.03
FB I 0.58± 0.02 0.52± 0.02
FB K 0.62± 0.01 0.58± 0.02
FS P 0.55± 0.01 0.51± 0.01
FS I 0.64± 0.01 0.57± 0.02
FS K 0.69± 0.01 0.62± 0.02
A-share FB P 0.52± 0.02 0.39± 0.03
FB I 0.58± 0.02 0.46± 0.03
FB K 0.62± 0.01 0.52± 0.01
FS P 0.55± 0.01 0.43± 0.02
FS I 0.64± 0.01 0.53± 0.02
FS K 0.69± 0.00 0.53± 0.03
B-share FB P 0.52± 0.02 0.58± 0.03
FB I 0.65± 0.02 0.63± 0.02
FB K 0.62± 0.03 0.69± 0.02
FS P 0.62± 0.01 0.58± 0.03
FS I 0.71± 0.02 0.59± 0.04
FS K 0.70± 0.03 0.73± 0.03
For filled trades in Fig. 3 (C) and (D), we can observe
power-law scaling behaviours between the normalize r and
ω for different types of trades in different positions:
r(ω)/〈r〉 ∼ (ω/〈ω〉)α, (5)
where α is the power-law scaling exponent. The power-law
scaling range spans about three orders of magnitude from
10−1 to 102. These two plots extend precious results for
which the power-law dependence of the price impact on
the trade size holds for FB and FS trades [31], such that
this law holds for individuals and institutions in different
positions of trading networks.
The power-law scaling exponents α are obtained by lin-
ear regressions of ln[r(ω)/〈r〉] against ln[ω/〈ω〉], which are
presented in table 1. A comparison of individual and in-
stitutional trades in the same position shows that
α0 > α1. (6)
It means that the price impact of filled trades of individ-
uals is much more sensitive to the trade size than that of
institutions. Generally, institutions are more professional
than individuals in financial markets. To reduce transac-
tion costs and risks, institutional traders use certain trad-
ing strategies to reduce their price impact. In contrast,
most of individual traders place orders with worse strate-
gies [33,38]. A comparison of trades in different positions
shows that the power-law exponents α for trades in differ-
ent positions of the trading networks have the following
p-4
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Fig. 3: (color online) Normalized price impact of institutional and individual trades in both A-share and B-share markets
at different positions of trading networks. The traders are classified into 3 types due to their positions (such as periphery,
intermediate, and kernel) in the trading network for individuals and institutions. The results for the four types of trades due
to their direction and aggressiveness are present in four plots: (A) Buyer-initiated partially filled trades, (B) Seller-initiated
partially filled trades, (C) Buyer-initiated filled trades, and (D) Seller-initiated filled trades.
relationship:
αP < αI < αK. (7)
The price impact of filled kernel trades is more sensitive
to the trade size than the trades outer shells. Moreover,
we observe certain asymmetry between buy trades and sell
trades such that
αFS > αFB. (8)
This buy/sell asymmetry was not observed when one did
not look into trade positions [31].
We perform the same analysis on A-share stocks and
B-share stocks separately. Nice power-law dependence of
the price impact on the trade size is also observed. The
power-law scaling exponents are presented in table 1. We
find that the relationships in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) also hold
for both individuals and institutions. The relationship
in Eq. (6) holds for A-share stocks, but not for B-share
stocks. Comparing the results of A-share stocks and B-
share stocks, we find that
αB > αA, (9)
where αA and αB stand respectively for the power-law
exponents of A-share stocks and B-share stocks.
Summary. – In this Letter, we have analyzed a large
data set of order flows recorded in the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange, focusing on the immediate price impact of in-
stitutional and individual trades in different positions of
stock trading networks. We perform a statistical analysis
of immediate price impact of all the traders trading 32 A-
share stocks and 11 B-share stocks in 2003. The data offer
a unique opportunity to compare a closed national market
(A-shares) with an international market (B-shares), indi-
viduals and institutions, partially filled and filled trades,
buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades, and trades at
different positions (periphery, intermediate and kernel) of
trading networks.
We constructed the stock trading networks based on
limit order book data and classified the traders into k
shells using the k-shell decomposition algorithm. Based
on PB, PS, FB, and FS trades, we investigate different
p-5
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trading behaviors of individuals and institutions at differ-
ent positions of trading network. Individual traders’ filled
trades are found to be more aggressive than institutional
traders’ filled trades. From periphery to intermediate to
kernel, the immediate price impact of institutional and in-
dividual trades increases. The analysis has also been con-
ducted separately for A-shares and B-shares and shows
that trades in the B-shares market are more aggressive
than in the A-shares market.
For filled trades, we confirmed the presence of power-law
price impacts, which holds for trades with directions and
aggressiveness, trades submitted by individuals and insti-
tutions, and trades at different positions of stock trading
networks. Our findings thus extend previous results [31].
The main contribution of this Letter stems from the fact
that we considered the topological structure of trading
networks and used the information extracted from net-
work positions, which has not been studies in the literature
[29–31,39–42]. Our findings shed new lights on interdisci-
plinary network analysis about topological structure and
price impacts in complex trading networks.
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